Charles Monroe v. Perry Phelps by unknown
2013 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-8-2013 
Charles Monroe v. Perry Phelps 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013 
Recommended Citation 
"Charles Monroe v. Perry Phelps" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 1011. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/1011 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
BLD-173        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3489 
___________ 
 
CHARLES THOMAS MONROE, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PERRY PHELPS; 
MICHAEL BRYAN; 
RAYMOND HANNUM  
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil No. 1:09-cv-01004) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sue L. Robinson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 28, 2013 
 
Before: SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  April 8, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro Se Appellant Charles Thomas Monroe, an inmate at the James T. Vaughn 
Correctional Center in Smyrna, Delaware, appeals from an order of the United States 
District Court for the District of Delaware denying his motions for appointment of 
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counsel and summary judgment and granting Appellee’s motion for summary judgment, 
in his civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Because this appeal does 
not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; 
I.O.P. 10.6. 
I. 
 Because we primarily write for the parties, we need only recite the facts necessary 
for our discussion.  Monroe brought claims for excessive force and retaliation against 
Sergeant Michael Bryan for an incident that occurred on January 7, 2008.1
                                              
1 Defendants Perry Phelps and Raymond Hannum were dismissed from the case by 
orders entered May 3, 2010, and May 19, 2011.  Phelps was dismissed because the claims 
against him were solely based on the theory of respondeat superior and liability in a § 
1983 action must be predicated on personal involvement, not on the basis of respondeat 
superior.  See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981).  Hannum was dismissed 
because Monroe failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing the claims 
against Hannum.  See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act of 1996 requires that a prisoner pursue all avenues of relief available within 
the prison’s grievance system before bringing a federal civil rights action concerning 
prison conditions).  We agree with these District Court’s rulings. 
  Monroe 
claimed that Bryan grabbed him from behind,  placed him in a choke hold and slammed 
him to the floor, injuring his back and neck.  Bryan prepared an incident report of the 
event.  At the time, Monroe was housed in the V building, which mainly houses inmates 
in drug treatment programs.  In his incident report, Bryan states that he saw Monroe 
make contact with another inmate and saw the inmate hand Monroe a small, white object.  
Monroe took the object and went into a telephone booth.  Bryan went up to Monroe and 
asked him for the object that he had received from the inmate.  Monroe refused and put 
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the white object in his mouth and began to chew.  Bryan believed the item was drugs, so 
he placed Monroe in a choke hold, brought him to the floor on his knees, and ordered him 
to spit out what was in his mouth.  Monroe spit out a small white piece of paper.   
 Correctional officer Sandra Werda witnessed the incident and filled out an 
incident report corroborating Bryan’s report.  She and Bryan handcuffed Monroe after he 
was on the floor.  Correctional officer Hannum assisted in restraining Monroe and helped 
Monroe to his feet.  Monroe was taken to the infirmary by wheelchair and he was given 
three Tylenol because he complained of lower back pain.  Monroe’s medical records 
indicate that he complained of lower back pain on at least two instances prior to the 
January 7, 2008 incident.  As a result of the incident, Monroe was charged with, and 
found guilty of, disorderly or threatening behavior, giving false alarm, abuse of 
privileges, failing to obey an order, lying, being off limits, and possession of non-
dangerous contraband.   
 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and Monroe filed a motion 
for appointment of counsel.  The District Court granted Bryan’s motion for summary 
judgment and denied Monroe’s motion for summary judgment, because, among other 
reasons, Monroe did not meet the standards for an Eighth Amendment excessive force 
claim or a retaliation claim.  The District Court denied Monroe’s motion for appointment 
of counsel.2
                                              
2 The District Court also inquired, sua sponte, whether Monroe was competent to litigate 
his action under Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(c)(2).  We conclude that the District Court did not abuse 
  Monroe timely filed this appeal. 
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II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review of 
a district court’s order granting or denying summary judgment, applying the same 
standard as the district court.  See Tri–M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 415 (3d Cir. 
2011).  We will affirm only if “drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Id.  The same standards and burdens 
apply on cross-motions for summary judgment.  Appelmans v. City of Phila., 826 F.2d 
214, 216 (3d Cir. 1987).  We review the denial of a request for counsel for abuse of 
discretion.  See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 158 (3d Cir. 1993).  We may summarily 
affirm the District Court’s decision if the appeal presents no substantial question.  See 
L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
III. 
 Section 1983 provides private citizens with a means to redress violations of federal 
law committed by state officials.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  To establish a claim under § 
1983, a plaintiff “must establish that she was deprived of a federal constitutional or 
statutory right by a state actor.”  Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009).  In this 
instance, Monroe argues that Bryan used excessive force during the January 7, 2008 
                                                                                                                                                  
its discretion in declining to appoint a guardian or counsel to represent Monroe’s interests 
in this instance.   See Gardner ex rel. Gardner v. Parson, 874 F.2d 131, 140 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(we review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to appoint a guardian ad 
litem under Rule 17(c)).   
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incident in violation of the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits prison officials from 
unnecessarily and wantonly inflicting pain in a manner that offends contemporary 
standards of decency.  See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992).  When reviewing 
Eighth Amendment excessive-force claims, we must determine whether the “force was 
applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and 
sadistically to cause harm .”  Id. at 7.  Whether the force applied was excessive requires 
the examination of several factors including: (1) the need for force, (2) the relationship 
between that need and the amount of force used, (3) the extent of the injury, (4) the extent 
of the threat to safety “as reasonably perceived by responsible officials,” and (5) “any 
efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.”  Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 
102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986).  Whether 
the force was excessive depends on the “extent of the force” and the surrounding 
circumstances, not upon the “resulting injuries.”  Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 648 
(3d Cir. 2002). 
 We agree with the District Court that there is nothing in the record to suggest that 
Bryan acted maliciously or sadistically to cause harm to Monroe.  Monroe acknowledges 
that he did not give Bryan the white object when he was asked to do so.  In light of the 
fact that Bryan believed the white object to be drugs and the fact that the incident 
occurred in a building that is used primarily for drug rehabilitation programs, Bryan acted 
reasonably.  Moreover, Monroe did not suffer serious injuries, and his complaint of back 
pain was one that he had prior to the incident.  While the absence of serious injury is not 
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dispositive, it does indicate that the force the guards used was itself limited.  See Wilkins 
v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1178 (2010).  In these circumstances, therefore,  the amount 
of force the Bryan used was reasonable as a matter of law. Thus, we conclude that 
Monroe does not have a valid Eighth Amendment excessive force claim and the District 
Court properly granted Bryan’s motion for summary judgment and properly denied 
Monroe’s motion for summary judgment.  
 Monroe also alleges a retaliation claim on the basis that he can prove that he is not 
guilty of the infractions resulting from the January 7, 2008 incident and that Bryan 
fabricated the allegations in retaliation for Monroe seeking legal recourse as a result of 
the incident.  A prisoner litigating a retaliation claim must show that the conduct 
provoking the alleged retaliation was constitutionally protected, that he suffered some 
“adverse action” at the hands of the prison officials “sufficient to deter a person of 
ordinary firmness from exercising his [constitutional] rights,” and that the 
constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial motivating factor in Defendants’ 
conduct.  Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001) (alteration in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  If a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of 
retaliation the burden shifts to the defendant “to demonstrate that even without the 
impetus to retaliate he would have taken the action complained of.”  Hartman v. Moore, 
547 U.S. 250, 260 (2006).   
 We agree with the District Court that the record does not support a finding that 
Monroe was subject to adverse actions of the type that would deter a prisoner of ordinary 
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firmness from exercising his constitutional rights.  As the District Court pointed out, 
Monroe filed several grievances after the January 7, 2008 incident, thus showing that he 
was not deterred from exercising his First Amendment rights.  Accordingly, we conclude 
that the District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Bryan for 
Monroe’s retaliation claim.   
IV. 
 Regarding Monroe’s motion for appointment of counsel, in Tabron v. Grace, 6 
F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1993), we articulated factors relevant to determine whether to appoint 
counsel for indigent civil litigants.  As a threshold matter, the indigent plaintiff’s case 
must have some arguable merit in fact and law.  Id. at 155.  If so, the court should then 
consider a number of additional factors including: (1) the plaintiff’s ability to present his 
or her own case; (2) the difficulty of the particular legal issues; (3) the degree to which 
factual investigation will be necessary and the ability of the plaintiff to pursue 
investigation; (4) the plaintiff’s capacity to retain counsel on his or her behalf; (5) the 
extent to which a case is likely to turn on credibility determinations; and (6) whether the 
case will require testimony from expert witnesses.  Id. At 155-57. 
 We agree with the District Court that the factors do not weigh in favor of 
representation by counsel.  The case is not so factually or legally complex that appointing 
an attorney was warranted.  Moreover, the filings in the case demonstrate that Monroe is 
able to clearly articulate his claims and represent himself.  Thus, we conclude that the 
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District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Monroe’s motion for appointment of 
counsel.   
V. 
 For the foregoing reasons, no substantial question is presented and we will affirm 
the judgment of the District Court.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.3
                                              
3 Because we find that Monroe has failed to assert valid Eighth Amendment excessive 
force and retaliation claims, there is no need to address whether Bryan is entitled to 
summary judgment on qualified immunity or Eleventh Amendment grounds. 
 
